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Abstract
In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the
core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced
game property.
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The theory of fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974, 1981) where
the notions of a fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are introduced.
There are two crucial factors in the framework of fuzzy games, the play-
ers and their participation levels. Hwang (2007) extends the notion of
the reduced game (Davis and Maschler, 1965) to fuzzy games by only
reducing the number of the players. Also, inspired by Serrano and Volij
(1998), he oﬀers an axiomatization of the core in the context of fuzzy
games. Here, we turn to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of the reduced game by
reducing both the number of the players and the participation levels.
We shall introduce such a reduced game to fuzzy NTU games and de-
ﬁne the related reduced game property and its converse. Also, we oﬀer
an extension of Peleg (1985)’s axiomatization of the core to fuzzy NTU
games.
2 Preliminaries
Let U be the universe of players.1 If N ⊆ U is a set of players, then a
fuzzy coalition is a vector α ∈ [0,1]N. The i-th coordinate αi of α is
called the participation level of player i in the fuzzy coalition α. For all
T ⊆ N, let |T| be the number of elements in T. Instead of [0,1]T, we
will write F T for the set of fuzzy coalitions. A player-coalition T ⊆ N
corresponds in a canonical way to the fuzzy coalition eT(N) ∈ F N, which
is the vector with eT
i (N) = 1 if i ∈ T, and eT
i (N) = 0 if i ∈ N \ T. The
fuzzy coalition eT(N) corresponds to the situation where the players in T
fully cooperate (i.e. with participation level 1) and the players outsides
T are not involved at all (i.e. they have participation level 0). Denote
the zero vector in RN by 0N. The fuzzy coalition 0N corresponds to the
empty player-coalition. Note that if no confusion can arise eT(N) will be
denoted by eT.
Let α ∈ F N, A(α,N) = {i ∈ N | αi > 0,α ∈ F N} is the set of players
who participate in α. Let x,y ∈ RN. x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N;
x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y; x  y if xi > yi for all i ∈ N. We denote
RN
+ = {x ∈ RN | x ≥ 0N}. Let A ⊆ RN. A is comprehensive if x ∈ A
and x ≥ y imply y ∈ A. The boundary of A is denoted by ∂A, and the
interior of A is denoted by intA. If x ∈ RN then x+A = {x+a | a ∈ A}.
Deﬁnition 1 A fuzzy NTU game is a pair (N,V ), where N is a non-
empty and ﬁnite set of players and V is a characteristic function that
1Assume that U is inﬁnite.
1assigns to each fuzzy coalition α = (αi)i∈N ∈ F N \ {0N} a subset V (α)
of RA(α,N), such that
V (α) is non-empty, closed and comprehensive, (1)
V (α) ∩ (x + R
A(α,N)
+ ) is bounded for every x ∈ R
A(α,N), (2)
if x,y ∈ ∂V (α) and x ≥ y, then x = y.( non-levelness ) (3)
The core of a fuzzy NTU game (N,V ) is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 The core C(N,V ) of (N,V ) consists of all x ∈ ∂V (eN)
that satisfy for all α ∈ F N \ {0N}, (αixi)i∈A(α,N) / ∈ intV (α).
We denote
Γc = {(N,V ) | C(N,V ) 6= ∅}.
3 Axioms and Reduced Games
A solution on Γc is a function σ which associates with each (N,V ) ∈ Γc
a subset σ(N,V ) of V (eN). Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc. Then, a payoﬀ vector x
of (N,V ) ∈ Γc is eﬃcient (EFF) if x ∈ ∂V (eN); a payoﬀ vector x of
(N,V ) ∈ Γc is individually rational (IR) if for all i ∈ N and for all
j ∈ (0,1], jxi / ∈ intV (je{i}). We will make use of the following axioms:
Let σ be a solution on Γc. σ satisﬁes non-emptiness (NE) if for
all (N,V ) ∈ Γc, σ(N,V ) 6= ∅. σ satisﬁes eﬃciency (EFF) if for all
(N,V ) ∈ Γc and for all x ∈ σ(N,V ), x is EFF. σ satisﬁes individual
rationality (IR) if for all (N,V ) ∈ Γc and for all x ∈ σ(N,V ), x is IR.
We extend to the fuzzy NTU games case the reduced game introduced
by Davis and Maschler (1965). Given x ∈ RN and S ⊆ N, we denote
xS ∈ RS to be the restriction of x to S.
Deﬁnition 3 Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc, x ∈ RN, S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅ and γ ∈
(0,1]N\S. The reduced game with respect to S, x and γ, (S,Vx,S,γ),
is deﬁned by for all α ∈ F S \ {0S},








∈ V (α,γQ,0(N\S)\Q)} , otherwise .
Note that the condition γ ∈ (0,1]N\S means that when renegotiating
the payoﬀ distribution within S, the members of N \ S will continue to
cooperate with the members of S. All members in N \ S take nonzero
levels based on the participation vector γ to cooperate.
The reduced game property and its converse are deﬁned as follows:
2• Reduced game property (RGP): If (N,v) ∈ Γc, S ⊆ N with
S 6= ∅, γ ∈ (0,1]N\S and x ∈ σ(N,v), then (S,Vx,S,γ) ∈ Γc and
xS ∈ σ(S,Vx,S,γ).
• Converse reduced game property (CRGP): If (N,v) ∈ Γc
with |N| ≥ 3, x ∈ V (eN), and for all S ⊂ N with |S| = 2 and for
all γ ∈ (0,1]N\S such that (S,Vx,S,γ) ∈ Γc and xS ∈ σ(S,Vx,S,γ),
then x ∈ σ(N,V ).
4 Axiomatization
In this section we shall use NE, IR, and RGP to characterize the core.
Lemma 1 Let (N,V ) be a fuzzy NTU game, x ∈ V (eN), S ⊆ N with
S 6= ∅, and γ ∈ (0,1]N\S. Then the reduced game (S,Vx,S,γ) is a fuzzy
NTU game.
Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 3.3 in Peleg
(1985).
Lemma 2 Let (N,V be a fuzzy NTU game, x ∈ V (eN), S ⊆ N with
S 6= ∅, and γ ∈ (0,1]N\S. Then x is EFF in (N,V ) if and only if xS is
EFF in the reduced game (S,Vx,S,γ).
Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 4.4 in Peleg
(1985).
Lemma 3 The core satisﬁes RGP.
Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 4.5 in Peleg
(1985).
Lemma 4 The core satisﬁes CRGP.
Proof. Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc with |N| ≥ 3 and let x ∈ V (eN). Suppose
that for all S ⊂ N with |S| = 2 and for all γ ∈ (0,1]N\S, (S,Vx,S,γ) ∈ Γc
and xS ∈ C(S,Vx,S,γ). We will show that x ∈ C(N,V ). Since xS ∈
C(S,Vx,S,γ), xS is EFF in (S,Vx,S,γ). Hence x is EFF in (N,V ) by Lemma
2. It remains to show that for all α ∈ F N \ {0N,eN}, (αixi)i∈A(α,N) / ∈
intV (α). Assume, on the contrary, that there exists α ∈ F N \ {0N,eN}
such that (αixi)i∈A(α,N) ∈ intV (α). Two cases can be distinguished:
Case 1: A(α,N) = N:
Choose k ∈ A(α,N) with αk 6= 1 ( This can be done since α 6= eN).












by taking Q = N \ S, we have that (αkxk,αjxj) ∈ intVx,S,γ(αk,αj).
Case 2: A(α,N) 6= N:
Choose k ∈ A(α,N). Let j / ∈ A(α,N), and let S = {k,j}. For conve-





Since αj = 0, by the same arguments as case 1 except taking Q =
A(α,N) \ {k}, we can derive that αkxk ∈ intVx,S,γ(αk,0).
Hence, by cases 1 and 2, xS / ∈ C(S,Vx,S,γ), the desired contradiction
has been obtained.
Lemma 5 Let σ be a solution on Γc. If σ satisﬁes IR and RGP then it
also satisﬁes EFF.
Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Lemma 5.4 in Peleg
(1985).
Lemma 6 If a solution σ on Γc satisﬁes IR and RGP, then for all
(N,V ) ∈ Γc, σ(N,V ) ⊆ C(N,V ).
Proof. Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc. If |N| = 1, then by IR of σ and C,
σ(N,v) ⊆ C(N,v). If |N| = 2, by Lemma 5, σ satisﬁes EFF. Let
x ∈ σ(N,V ). It remains to show that for all α ∈ F N \ {0N,eN},
(αixi)i∈A(α,N) / ∈ intV (α). Let α ∈ F N \ {0N,eN}. Two cases can be
distinguished:
Case 1: |A(α,N)| = 1:
We have done by IR of σ.
Case 2: |A(α,N)| = 2:
Assume that N = {k,j}, and k ∈ A(α,N) with αk 6= 1 (This can
be done since α 6= eN). Let γ = αj 6= 0. Consider the reduced
game ({k},Vx,{k},γ). By RGP of σ, xk ∈ σ({k},Vx,{k},γ). Thus, xk ∈











by taking Q = {j}, we have that (αkxk,αjxj) / ∈ intV (αk,αj).
Hence, by cases 1 and 2, σ(N,v) ⊆ C(N,v). It remains to consider
the case |N| ≥ 3. Let x ∈ σ(N,V ). Since σ satisﬁes RGP, for all
S ⊆ N with |S| = 2 and for all γ ∈ (0,1]N\S, xS ∈ σ(S,Vx,S,γ). Hence,
xS ∈ C(S,Vx,S,γ). So, x ∈ C(N,V ) by CRGP of the core.
4Lemma 7 Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc and x ∈ C(N,V ). There exists (N0,V 0) ∈
Γc, where N ⊂ N0 and |N0| = |N|+1 such that {(x,0)} = C(N0,V 0) and
for all γ ∈ (0,1), (N,(V 0)(x,0),N,γ) = (N,V ) .
Proof. Let (N,V ) ∈ Γc and x ∈ C(N,V ). Let N0 = N ∪ {p} where
p ∈ U \ N. We deﬁne a game (N0,V 0) by the following rules:2
1. For all 0 < u ≤ 1, let V 0 
ue{p}(N0)

= {z ∈ R{p} | z ≤ 0}.
2. For all t ∈ F N0 \ {0N0,eN0(N0)} with tp = 1, let
V








3. For all t ∈ F N0 \ {0N0} with tp = 0, let V 0(t) = V (tN).
4. For other t, let aA(t,N0) ∈ RA(t,N0) be such that a
A(t,N0)
p = 1 and
a
A(t,N0)








A(t,N0) | u ∈ R}.3
Next, we prove that (x,0) ∈ C(N0,V 0). Let y = (x,0). By rule 1, for
all t with t = ue{p}(N0) where 0 < u ≤ 1, tpyp = u · 0 = 0 / ∈ intV 0(t).
By rules 2 and 3, (tiyi)i∈A(t,N0) / ∈ intV 0(t) for all t ∈ F N0 \{0N0,eN0(N0)}
with tp = 1 or tp = 0. It remains to show that for all t in rule 4,
(tiyi)i∈A(t,N0) / ∈ intV 0(t). Suppose not, then there exists t in rule 4 such
that (tiyi)i∈A(t,N0) ∈ intV 0(t). That is, there exist (tizi)i∈A(t,N0) ∈ V 0(t)
such that tizi > tiyi for all i ∈ A(t,N0). Since tp 6= 0 and yp = 0, zp > 0.





uaA(t,N0) for some (tiwi)i∈A(t,N0)\{p} ∈ V (tN) and some u > 0. But then,
(tiwi)i∈A(t,N0)\{p} > (tizi)i∈A(t,N0)\{p} > (tiyi)i∈A(t,N0)\{p} = (tixi)i∈A(t,N0)\{p}
and hence x / ∈ C(N,V ). This is a contradiction. So, y ∈ C(N0,V 0).
To verify the uniqueness, let z ∈ C(N0,V 0). By rule 1, zp ≥ 0. By
rule 2, zi + zp ≥ xi for all i ∈ N. By rule 4, there exists w ∈ V (eN(N))




. Hence, wi = zi + zp ≥ xi for
all i ∈ N. Since x ∈ ∂V (eN(N)), wi = zi + zp = xi for all i ∈ N.
Now, if zp > 0 then zi < xi for all i ∈ N. Since x ∈ V (eN(N)),
zN ∈ intV (eN(N)) = intV 0(eN(N0) by rule 3. This contradicts to that
z ∈ C(N0,V 0). Hence, {(x,0)} = {y} = C(N0,V 0). It remains to show
2In contrast with the proof of Peleg (1985), the design of (N0,V 0) in Lemma 7 can
not be applied to Lemma 6.2 of Peleg.
3The deﬁnition of V 0(t) in rule 4 is adapted from Peleg (1985, p.210).
5that for all γ ∈ (0,1), (N,(V 0)y,N,γ) = (N,V ). Let γ ∈ (0,1). Clearly, for
all t in rule (4), {z ∈ RA(t,N0)\{p} | (z,0) ∈ V 0(t)} = V (tN). Combining
this with rule (3), we have (N,(V 0)y,N,γ) = (N,V ) by the deﬁnition of
(V 0)y,N,γ.
Theorem 1 On Γc, the core is the only solution satisfying NE, IR and
RGP.
Proof. It can easily be deduced from the proof of Theorem 5.5 in Peleg
(1985).
The following examples show that each of the axioms used in Theorem
1 is logically independent of the others. These are corresponding to
Examples 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 in Peleg (1985), respectively.
Example 1 Let σ(N,V ) = ∅ for all (N,V ) ∈ Γc. Then σ satisﬁes IR
and RGP, but it violates NE.
Example 2 Let σ(N,V ) = ∂V (eN) for all (N,V ) ∈ Γc. Then σ satisﬁes
NE and RGP, but it violates IR.
Example 3 Let σ(N,V ) = {x ∈ ∂V (eN) | x is IR } for all (N,V ) ∈ Γc.
Then σ satisﬁes NE and IR, but it violates RGP.
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